Physical activity is important for managing the side effects and long-term outcomes of cancer treatment, yet many adolescents and young adults diagnosed with cancer are not meeting PA guidelines. Body image and social support are two factors that can influence PA behavior and require further attention in this population. The purpose of this study was to examine the associations between body image, social support, and PA among AYAs. An online cross-sectional survey administered through the Research Electronic Data Capture platform was (...) used to assess self-reported body image, social support, and PA in AYAs. Based on findings from path analyses, body image and social support were directly associated with PA. Social support was also directly associated with body image. However, there were no indirect effects. These findings provide preliminary support for the influential role of appearance and fitness body-related emotions and cancer-specific social support on PA. The results have important implications for the development of targeted strategies aimed at improving body image and social support, with the overall goal of increasing AYAs’ PA. (shrink)

The Continuous Parameter Estimation Model is applied to develop individual genomic-level heritabilities for the latent hierarchical structure and developmental dynamics of Life History (LH) strategy LH strategies relate to the allocations of bioenergetic resources into different domains of fitness. LH has moderate to high population-level heritability in humans, both at the level of the high-order Super-K Factor and the lower-order factors, the K-Factor, Covitality Factor, and General Factor of Personality (GFP). Several important questions remain unexplored. We developed measures of genome-level (...) heritabilities employing an American sample of 316 monozygotic (MZ) and 274 dizygotic (DZ) twin dyads and a Swedish sample of 863 MZ and 475 DZ twin dyads. This novel heritability index measures individual genetic transmissibility, therefore opening new avenues for analyzing complex interactions among heritable traits inaccessible to standard structural equations methods. For these samples: (1) moderate to high heritability of factor loadings of Super-K on its lower-order factors is demonstrated, evidencing biological preparedness, genetic accommodation, and the gene-culture coevolution of biased epigenetic rules of development; (2) moderate to high heritability of the magnitudes of the effect of the higher-order factors upon their loadings on their constituent factors, evidencing genetic constraints upon phenotypic plasticity; and (3) that heritability of the LH factors, of factor loadings, and of the magnitudes of the correlations among factors are weaker among those with slower LH speeds, demonstrating that inter-individual variation in transmissibility is a function of individual socioecological selection pressures. (shrink)

F.A.Hayek is generally considered to be a representative of what, in regard to the methodology of the human sciences, is commonly referred to as ?methodological individualism?; (MI). This paper is an attempt to determine the exact nature and significance of Hayek's own particular brand of ?individualism.?; In particular, it attempts to show that Hayek's MI is grossly misinterpreted when it is viewed as being merely another instance of the atomistic or analytic individualism characteristic of much modern thinking. The ?true?; individualism (...) that Hayek argues for is in fact one which highlights the irremediably social nature of human being that recent hermeneutical and postmodern writers have stressed. (shrink)

Given an admissible indexing φ of the countable atomless Boolean algebra B, an automorphism F of B is said to be recursively presented (relative to φ) if there exists a recursive function $p \in \operatorname{Sym}(\omega)$ such that F ⚬ φ = φ ⚬ p. Our key result on recursiveness: Both the subset of $\operatorname{Aut}(\mathscr{B})$ consisting of all those automorphisms which are recursively presented relative to some indexing, and its complement, the set of all "totally nonrecursive" automorphisms, are uncountable. This arises (...) as a consequence of the following combinatorial investigations: (1) A comparison of the cycle structures of f and f̄, where f is a permutation of some free basis of B and f̄ is the automorphism of B induced by f. (2) An explicit description of the permutations of ω whose conjugacy classes in $\operatorname{Sym}(\omega)$ are (a) uncountable, (b) countably infinite, and (c) finite. (shrink)

...Witherspoon's Course in Political Theory, as Taken by James Madison Dennis F. Thompson Princeton University [523...Witherspoon's Course in Political Theory, as Taken by James Madison. James Madison was an unusually wen-prepared student when, at eighteen...

Revisiting the history of relativity Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9466-4 Authors Lewis Pyenson, Department of History, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5242, USA Sean F. Johnston, School of Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Glasgow, Rutherford-McCowan Building, Dumfries, Glasgow, Scotland G2 0RB, UK Alberto A. Martínez, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station B7000, Austin, TX 78712-0220, USA Richard Staley, Department of the History of Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 226 Bradley Memorial Building, 1225 Linden Drive, (...) class='Hi'>Madison, WI 53706-1528, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1. (shrink)

This study discusses the treatise of Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 908/1502) named Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm. This treatise criticizes a definition of knowledge adopted by some theologians in the late period (mutaʾakhkhirīn). The definition of knowledge at issue consists of three components: Attribution, discernment, no possibility of contradiction. Knowledge is an attribute as a category and with this attribution, a discernment is obtained. As a result of this process knowledge is acquired and there should be no possibility of this knowledge (...) to be inconsistent. Davvānī examines eight possibilities of the definition on knowledge. In each of these eight possibilities a different problems arises. According to Davvānī, the definition mentioned is problematic in all probability. Nonetheless, Davvānī does not propose another definition of knowledge that can replace the definition of knowledge that he criticizes. This article represents the process of reaching the definition of knowledge stated in the history of theological thought. The definitions on knowledge made from the first period (al-mutaqaddimīn) are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions are explained. There are two main approaches regarding the nature of knowledge in Islamic thought: According to the first approach pioneered by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1202), absolute knowledge is a priory (badīhī) and undefinable. According to the second one, the nature of absolute knowledge is a posteriori (naẓarī) and definable. The first part of this article includes the definitions and criticisms of knowledge in Islamic thought. The second part discusses the claim of originality. In the second part, Davvānī’s treatise will be evaluated for the first time. According to the conclusion of the treatise, the definition made to find the essence of knowledge is unfounded in all respect. It is important to evaluate the treatise as a reflection of anti-essentialism in the history of Islamic thought. Most contemporary studies do not count this treatise among Davvānī’s works. In the biography book al-Aʿlām written by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1976), Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm is counted among the works of Davvānī. In the introduction of more than one manuscript, the work is clearly attributed to Davvānī. As a result of the double-sided research, it has been ensured that the work belongs to Davvānī. However, in other two manuscripts containing the same treatise, the work is shown as belonging to an unknown person named Şāirzāda. But there is no information found about this person. This name seems more like a copyist (mustansıh) than an author. Possibly, such a mistake occurred as a result of confusing the two names. Davvānī’s small volume treatise sheds light on the intellectual atmosphere and level of its period. The definition of knowledge mentioned in the classical theology book of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) called al-Mawāqif is superior to other definitions of knowledge. Instead of this definition of knowledge, which is presented as perfect, Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) preferred the definition of knowledge attributed to al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. This preference has been accepted as an implicit criticism for future generations, including Davvānī. Those who claimed that Jurjānī did not taken a random choice, carried on their criticism by going over the definition. The fine craftsmanship revealed in the treatise reveals that critical thinking is used intensively. The properly understanding of the treatise depends on knowing the science of logic and following it with intense attention. The definition of knowledge is examined from various angles with the help of concepts such as conception, ratification, judgment and contradiction (nakz) of the science of logic. In the science of logic, every layer of knowledge such as certainty, conjecture, imitation, doubt is investigated one by one. In the science of kalām, attention is paid that the ideal level of knowledge is precise. An uncertain knowledge is not considered knowledge according to kalām. Because the main goal of theologians is to build religious beliefs on the obtained certain knowledge. It is not accepted to base knowledge to a probable information on imprecise knowledge. For a knowledge among the knowns to reach the level of certainty, it must be correct and exclude other possibilities. Another condition is required for certainty in the definition of knowledge that Davvānī examines in his treatise is that the opposite is wrong. The fact that a piece of information is considered true depends on the fact that its reverse is false. In this treatise, it is discussed how to look for the contradictions or discrepancy that are wanted to be excluded. Knowledge is inseparable from the human mind, from outside of the world, or from the relationship between the two. (shrink)

In bioethics, discussions of justice have tended to focus on questions of fairness in access to health care: is there a right to medical treatment, and how should priorities be set when medical resources are scarce. But health care is only one of many factors that determine the extent to which people live healthy lives, and fairness is not the only consideration in determining whether a health policy is just. In this pathbreaking book, senior bioethicists Powers and Faden confront foundational (...) issues about health and justice. How much inequality in health can a just society tolerate. The audience for the book is scholars and students of bioethics and moral and political philosophy, as well as anyone interested in public health and health policy. (shrink)

I Deliberation, Practical Syllogisms , and Intuition. Introduction Aristotle's views on moral reasoning are a difficult and much disputed subject. ...

Structural Injustice advances a theory of what structural injustice is and how it works. Powers and Faden present both a philosophically powerful, integrated theory about human rights violations and structural unfairness, alongside practical insights into how to improve them.

In this article, we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption (...) in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberty and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty. (shrink)

A growing body of literature argues that achieving radical change in the agri-food system requires a radical renegotiation of our relationship with the environment alongside a change in our thinking and approach to transformational food politics. This paper argues that relational approaches such as a more-than-human ethic of care (MTH EoC) can offer a different and constructive perspective to analyse agri-food system transformation because it emphasises social structures and relationships as the basis of environmental change. A MTH EoC has not (...) yet been applied to regenerative agriculture, yet other literature on regenerative agriculture suggests that care may be present in these spaces and calls for the need for social science analysis of the regenerative movement. This paper uses a MTH EoC lens to reveal a diverse array of ways in which power is and can be deployed for change in the regenerative agriculture movement in Aotearoa, New Zealand. Globally, regenerative agriculture tends to be analysed through positivist, scientific approaches that focus on biophysical markers of ecological improvement. Yet, a relational approach reveals how engagement in regenerative agriculture is creating significant shifts in mindset towards more holistic and relational understandings of biological and social ecosystems. A regenerative mindset framework is suggested as a method of understanding the connection between a regenerative form of thinking, being and doing for farmers. Interviews suggested that this shift in farmers’ socio-ecological relations is crucial to the transformational potential of regenerative agriculture. This paper argues that relational analyses such as the MTH EoC approach used to analyse regenerative agriculture in this research, refresh the way we analyse agri-food system change. They also are critical to guiding and supporting on-the-ground socio-ecological shifts that are necessary to see agricultural transformation. (shrink)

Jedan od temeljnih pojmova Aristotelove teorije o pjesništvu je ‘vjerojatno’. Obično se o ‘vjerojatnom’ misli kao o onom što je slično istini, no za Aristotela to je tek jedna od njegovih značajki. Sam pojam vjerojatnog produbljuje iznoseći razlike između povijesnog i pjesničkog govora, preko dogođenog i onoga što bi se moglo dogoditi. Članak donosi analizu Aristotelovog nadilaženja Platonovog shvaćanja umjetnosti, u prvom redu shvaćanjem umjetnosti kao vještine te novim odnosom prema oponašanju, zatim proučava razvoj razlike između istinitog i sličnog, između (...) mogućeg i nemogućeg. Izravni je interes ove studije pokazati kako Aristotel preko navedenih razlika ukazuje ne samo na filozofsku dimenziju pjesništva, nego i da preko pojma vjerojatnog umjetničkom djelu potvrđuje njegovu unutarnju koherenciju i vezu koja ne ovisi o izvanjskim zakonitostima te da umjetničko djelo u sebi pronalazi svoj princip, sredstvo i cilj.One of the fundamental concepts of Aristotle’s theory of poetry is ‘probable’. ‘Probable’ is usually thought of being similar to truth, as for Aristotle it is but one of its features. Reflecting the differences between historical and poetic expression, through what happened and what might happen, Aristotle deepens the concept of ‘probable’. The article analyzes Aristotle’s surpassing Plato’s comprehension of art, primary through perceiving art as a skill and the new attitude toward imitation. Thereupon, the development of the difference between true and similar is being studied: between the possible and the impossible. The main interest of this study is to present how Aristotle, through mentioned differences, indicates not only the philosophical dimension of poetry, but through the concept of ‘probable’, confirms inner coherence and connection of a work of art which does not depend on external laws but finds its own principle, means and objectives within itself. (shrink)

Aristotelov nauk o navici, osim toga što je važan i bogat u sebi, predstavlja temelj potpunijeg shvaćanja njegove teorije o vrlinama, a time i njegove cjelokupne etike. Osnovne ideje ove problematike kroz cijelu povijest filozofije često su budile interes, a i danas njegov nauk tvori jezgru razmišljanja o navici, te je neminovno polazište suvremenih spekulacija. Stoga ćemo se uz obradu glavnih tekstova o navici u Aristotelovim djelima osvrnuti i na interpretaciju talijanskog filozofa Luigi Pareysona, koji smatra da je Aristotelova originalnost (...) u ideji vezivanja dvaju različitih pojmova éthos i héxis. Pareyson osobito osvjetljava vezu u kojoj éthos završava da bi dao mjesto héxisu te objašnjava kako héxis može proizići iz éthosa.U prvom redu iznijet ćemo razliku i odnos između héxis i éthosa te kako oni mogu biti izvor navici, koja je kao takva rezultat i uvjet čovjekova djelovanja. Po Aristotelu, preko ponavljanja čina navika omogućava da čovjek bude onakvim kakvim se sam čini, pri čemu se događa prijelaz sa slobode na neophodnost, te s truda na spontanost. Drugim riječima, one radnje koje su samoj volji u početku predstavljale napor i trud, nakon postizanja navike iste radnje obavlja spontano i lako. Ovu vlastitost navike Aristotel smatra vrlo važnom u odgoju i politici radi čega se može reći kako je ova tema i u današnjem vremenu vrlo aktualna.Besides being important and rich in itself, Aristotle’s concept of habit represents the foundation of a more comprehensive understanding of his theory of virtues, and with it his ethics as a whole. Throughout the entire history of philosophy the underlying ideas of this issue have frequently generated interest; even today his teachings lie at the very core of one’s reflections on habit and are inevitably the very starting point of contemporary speculations. Thus, in addition to analysing Aristotle’s main texts on habit, this paper also examines the interpretations given by the Italian philosopher Luigi Pareyson, who holds that Aristotle’s originality lies in the idea of linking two different concepts, namely éthos and héxis. Pareyson sheds light on the relation in which ethos ends in order to make room for héxis, and further explains that the latter can issue from the former.The authoress first expounds the difference and relation between éthos and héxis, as well as the way in which they can be the source of habit, which is – as such – both the outcome and condition of man’s deeds. According to Aristotle, by repeating acts, habits enable man to be such as he appears to be to himself, in which freedom transforms into necessity and effort into spontaneity. In other words, once the acts that were initially effortful and laborious to the will become a habit, the will does them spontaneously and with ease. Aristotle considers this property of habit vitally important in education and politics, due to which it can indeed be said that this topic is current even today. (shrink)

This paper investigates the adequacy of evidential relevance relations proposed by Glymour and others. These accounts incorporate, as a necessary condition, what I call the Positive Instance Condition (PIC): the evidence statement and auxiliary assumptions entail a "positive instance" of the hypothesis. I argue that any account which incorporates PIC as a necessary condition while allowing "bootstrap testing" is doomed to fail. A nonbootstrapping evidential relevance relation of similar form is proposed, and it is argued that, in addition to avoiding (...) published counter examples, this new relation meets two general requirements which, if not met, would undermine the ability of any account that incorporates PIC to accord with our intuitions of evidential relevance. (shrink)

Suppose that you have deeply personal information that you do not want to share. Further suppose that this information could help others, perhaps even saving their lives. Should you reveal the information or keep it secret? With the increasing prevalence of genetic testing, more and more people are finding themselves in this situation. Although a patient's genetic results are potentially relevant to all her biological family members, her first‐degree relatives—parents, children, and full siblings—are most likely to be affected. This is (...) especially true for genetic mutations—like those in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—that are associated with a dramatically increased risk of disease. Fortunately, people are usually willing to share results with their at‐risk relatives. Occasionally, however, a patient refuses to disclose her findings to anyone outside her clinical team. Ethicists have written little on patients’ moral duties to their at‐risk relatives. Moreover, the few accounts that have been advanced are problematic. Some unnecessarily expose patients’ genetic information to relatives who are unlikely to benefit from it, and others fail to ensure that patients’ most vulnerable relatives are informed of their genetic risks. Patients’ duty to warn can be defended in a way that avoids these problems. I argue that the duty to share one's genetic results is grounded in the principle of rescue—the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. When these two criteria are satisfied, a patient will most likely have a duty to warn. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

Technological advances in genetic testing have enabled prospective parents to learn about their risk of passing a genetic condition to their future children. One option for those who want to ensure that their biological children do not inherit a genetic condition is to create embryos through in vitro fertilisation and use a technique called preimplantation genetic testing to screen embryos for genetic abnormalities before implantation. Unfortunately, due to its high cost, IVF-with-PGT is out of reach for the vast majority of (...) Americans. This article addresses an issue that has been underexplored in the medical ethics literature: the lack of insurance coverage for IVF-with-PGT.Within the US system, a key concept in insurance is that of medically necessary care, which broadly consists of diagnostic services and treatment services. In this article, I argue that IVF-with-PGT could be classified as either a diagnostic service or as a treatment service. To make this case, I show that IVF-with-PGT is similar to other types of services that are often covered by US insurance providers. In light of these similarities, I argue that the current system is inconsistent with respect to what is—and is not—covered by insurance. To promote consistency and fairness in coverage, like cases should be treated alike—starting with greater coverage for IVF-with-PGT. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

Articles by Lyn Horn and Alison Thompson highlight several points crucial to understanding how our theory figures in wider debates about social justice as well as the particular relevance of our theory for assessing the overall practice of public health (Horn, 2013; Thompson, 2013). We begin with these two articles, first to respond to and concur with many of their central points, and second to set the stage for dealing more efficiently with some points raised in the other articles.

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

When new drugs are approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the default assumption is that they will be available by prescription only, safe for use exclusively under clinical supervision. The paternalism underlying this default must be interrogated in order to ensure appropriate respect for patient autonomy. Upon closer inspection, prescription requirements are justified when nonprescription status would risk harm to third parties and when a large segment of the population would struggle to exercise their autonomy in using a drug (...) safely and effectively on their own. Although these justifications can support prescription status for many drugs, we propose that reversing the FDA's current default to instead begin with a presumption in favor of over‐the‐counter status is the best way to avoid interference with valid claims of patient autonomy. Under this approach, a range of drug products could be considered for an OTC switch, including oral contraceptives, statins, and HIV‐prevention drugs. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

: The increasing reliance upon, and perhaps the growing public and professional skepticism about, the special expertise of bioethicists suggests the need to consider the limits of moral expertise. For all the talk about method in bioethics, we, bioethicists, are still rather far off the mark in understanding what we are doing, even when we may be going about what we are doing fairly well. Quite often, what is most fundamentally at stake, but equally often insufficiently acknowledged, are inherently political, (...) essentially contested visions of the most compelling and attractive forms of life for individuals and social organization. The current situation in bioethics parallels similar debates in eighteenth-century jurisprudence, especially Jeremy Bentham's withering critique of the prevalent forms of judicial argument and his own, equally unsuccessful, attempt to develop a decision-making procedure in ethics that would operate on a plane above politics. The risk, both then and now, is that we will fail to appreciate the wide range of reasonable disagreement that will remain past the point of extended reflection and discussion. (shrink)

Political liberalism has increasingly come under fire from both the right and the left, in politics as well as in philosophy. In this new study, G.B. Madison offers a systematic rebuttal to these contemporary critics, attempting to demonstrate that the basic principles of classical liberal philosophy are not only internally valid and coherent but also directly relevant to the problems faced by society in the post-industrial age. Building on the theory of Frank H. Knight and other liberal tinkers, (...) class='Hi'>Madison outlines the postmodern theory of reason that is presupposed within classical liberal theory and makes the case that as a political philosophy liberalism can be justified entirely within its own terms, without reference to arbitrary or absolute values. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...) have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief. (shrink)